The Riddle Over Representation of Kurds in Turkey’s Politics October 04, 2021
While
there have been numerous failed attempts to resolve the Kurdish issue in Turkey
in the past, the Syrian conflict has added new dimensions and complexities to
an already challenging matter. The political undertakings occasionally dubbed
as “democratic openings” or “resolution processes” have ultimately faltered due
to a multitude of political and social dynamics. But the chief causes of these
failures are firmly rooted in the lack of long-term strategic planning,
short-term political calculations, competing and conflicting agendas of various
political players overseeing such initiatives to end decades-old Kurdish
conflict.
Recent remarks by the
main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu
prompted a new debate about
who should be the major interlocutor representing Kurds in Turkey to resolve
the question of the century in the region. Kılıçdaroğlu stated that: “We can
see the HDP as a legal body. We can resolve it [the Kurdish issue] with a legal
body if it is to be resolved.” Denying the existence of the Kurdish issue,
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan joined the debate and claimed that his ruling AKP
government has “already solved this issue.”
Although
the debate over who should be the legitimate interlocutor drags on
indefinitely, taking on the Kurdish issue has become more complicated than ever
before due partly to the conflict and Turkey’s military activism in Syria. For
decades, the Kurdish issue has dominated the political landscape; however, its
scope has never been more internationalized than it is today. I was directly
involved in the Kurdish resolution processes in 2009 and in the early 2010s,
and based on my firsthand observation, it could be reasonably argued that the
AKP leadership viewed the entire process from narrowly defined political
calculations. AKP’s attempts to resolve the issue were in part motivated by their
desire to weather the election period with a pause in fighting with or attacks
from the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)- the group is listed as a
terrorist organization by Turkey and the United States. By doing so, AKP wanted
to use it for political propaganda and buy out Kurdish votes.
The
former co-chair of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), Selahattin Demirtaş, sided with Kılıçdaroğlu
and issued a statement from prison. “The HDP … is a political actor of its own
will and it is — of course — an interlocutor.” The current HDP leadership also reaffirms Demirtaş’s position. Main
opposition party leader Kilicdaroglu’s remarks are significant for several
reasons. First, he started a discussion that the Kurdish issue has yet to be
resolved and that the main interlocutor for the Kurds should be the HDP, which
faces a
closure case at Turkey’s
Constitutional Court. Second, his initiative could have consequences for the
AKP in the next general elections. For the first time in years, AKP could lose
its monopoly regarding the debates over the resolution of the Kurdish issue.
Since 2007, the AKP has been the pioneer and dominant political actor, but for
the first time in years, the AKP could lose its leading role. President
Erdogan’s continued denial of the existence of the Kurdish issue and AKP’s
alliance with the ultranationalist MHP could drive Kurds further away from his
party.
Third,
what makes the CHP chairman's recent public statement remarkable is the fact
that it was CHP, the oldest party of the republican era, that was reluctant to
recognize Kurds' cultural, linguistic, and other rights while favoring a
military solution to the conflict for a long time. Now the party went through a
sea change. Needless to say, this hinges on CHP’s will to retain its position
that the HDP is a legitimate actor as the main interlocutor to facilitate any
dialogue around the Kurdish issue. This could ensure HDP’s and Kurds’ de facto
support in the next general elections in 2023 or an early election in 2022, as
it happened in the 2019 municipal elections where CHP’s mayoral candidates were
endorsed by the Kurdish voters in metropolitical cities like Istanbul.
Fourth,
Kılıçdaroğlu’s remarks renewed the discussion about who should be the leading
representative for the Kurds. Since the 2015 general elections, there have been
clear divisions between then-HDP co-chair Demirtaş and jailed PKK leader Öcalan
regarding how they see Erdogan and his leadership. AKP’s main strategy had been
to instrumentalize and revitalize Öcalan, in particular, during the resolution
processes and election periods. Despite Öcalan’s unrivaled position in the PKK
and his popularity among the Kurds, Demirtaş has emerged since 2015 as the
young and energetic leader who could unite Kurds and get support from not only
the Kurdish voters but also secular leftists and liberals in Turkey. His famous
speech,
“we will not make you the President,” leading up to the June 2015 parliamentary
elections, and his vow that “there has never been a deal between us and the
Justice and Development Party (AKP), and there will never be…” have signified
his position vis-à-vis HDP-AKP relations. These public statements also
magnified the split between Demirtaş and Öcalan who often loomed large over the
HDP as an influential figure with a say over the electoral strategies or plans
of the Kurdish party. The latter has considered Erdogan as an ally and his
ticket for his release from prison. Erdogan and his government presented Öcalan
as the only interlocutor for the Kurdish issue. The current debate could weaken
the alliance of convenience between
Erdogan and Öcalan as he may see the recent debate around the Kurdish conflict
as detrimental to his image.
Finally,
Kılıçdaroğlu’s move received support from CHP’s electoral ally IYI Party in the
Nation’s Alliance, which could further strengthen the Alliance’s position
despite AKP’s attempts to create divisions between the two parties.
Despite
being in prison, Demirtaş is an influential political actor who could inspire
the Kurdish youth in Turkey and around the region. If any future initiative to
resolve the intractable Kurdish question is to survive, the Grand National
Assembly of Turkey should be the platform where the process will be transparent
and the HDP will be an interlocutor for the Kurds.
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